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Comment
Dennis Lindley
I was taught by Harold Jeffreys, having attended
his postgraduate lectures at Cambridge in the aca-
demic year 1946–1947, and also knew him when I
joined the Faculty there. I thought I appreciated the
Theory of Probability rather well, so was astonished
to read this splendid paper, which so successfully
sheds new light on the book by placing it in the
context of recent developments.
Jeffreys’s—he preferred that form of the posses-
sive—main aim in writing the Theory, his term for
TP, was to provide tools for scientists, like himself,
more famous then for his geophysics, to use in the
observational data they encountered. In the preface
to the second edition, he criticizes reviewers of the
first for the fact that “no mention was made of the
fact that the book contained useful methods of treat-
ment of several problems of practical importance.”
It is primarily a text on operational statistics. This
is most strikingly seen in his development of sig-
nificance tests, producing results that are distinct
from those of Fisher, who was also at Cambridge,
though the distinction was not apparent to either
of them then. Cambridge was then, as it still is, a
true university in the sense that you would regu-
larly meet people outside your own, often narrow,
discipline, in college activities. In this atmosphere,
Jeffreys was much influenced by a group of philoso-
phers including W. E. Johnson, C. D. Broad and J.
M. Keynes, and, as a result, thought seriously about
the scientific method, where he was also influenced
by Karl Pearson’s Grammar of Science. (In my view,
the best thing KP ever wrote.) It is this atmosphere
of data collection in astronomy, combined with the
philosophy of science, that produced the Theory;
an atmosphere in which mathematics is an essential
tool, but only a tool. His attitude to mathematics
is best seen in the magisterial book he wrote with
his wife, Methods of Mathematical Physics (Jeffreys
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and Swirles, 1946). In light of these considerations,
it is clear that his respect for mathematical rigor,
while high, did not occupy a dominant position; it
was the application that mattered. Robert and his
colleagues are right to criticize Jeffreys’s attitude
to improper distributions but, if uniform over the
whole real line gave a sensible posterior, that was
good enough for him. He did notice the difficulties
with several variances.
There is one point in the Theory where, in my
view, he makes an error that he might have rec-
ognized. It occurs in equation (1) in Section 3.10
when, in modern terms, he integrates over the sam-
ple space to produce the invariants needed for his
objective priors. In retrospect, it is surprising that
he did this, especially when, elsewhere in the The-
ory, he condemns the use of integration over the
tails of distributions, so incorporating results that
did not occur, in the common, non-Bayesian form
of a significance test. As a result of the integration
in equation (1) the invariant prior can depend on
the experiment to be performed; that is, the sam-
ple space to be used. Thus the invariant prior for
a chance θ would differ according to whether you
were going to use direct, or inverse, binomial sam-
pling. Chance θ was, for Jeffreys, a representation of
a real thing and ignorance of it should not depend
on how it was to be studied. I did not appreciate
this issue until Birnbaum introduced me to the like-
lihood principle.
This error, in a sense, arises from a disputed philo-
sophical view of the nature of science. Jeffreys, like
many scientists, both then and now, regarded the
scientific method as objective; indeed objectivity was
held to be one of, if not the principal, advantages of
science over other ways of understanding the world.
It was his search for objectivity, in the form of a
definition of ignorance, that led him to violate the
likelihood principle, which he had recognized rather
informally in the condemnation of tails mentioned
above. It is obvious now, and should have been at
the time of the first edition in 1946, that there are
subjective elements in the scientific method as when,
in the early stages of an investigation, scientists dis-
agree because of the limited data available. It is
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only with the accumulation of more evidence that
agreement is reached and apparent objectivity ob-
tained. Statistical methods, as Haldane pointed out,
are most valuable with modest amounts of data. Jef-
freys’s error left the way for de Finetti and Savage to
lay the foundations for Bayesian ideas in a coherent
way.
Let me turn from errors to his triumphs, and the
great concepts that he introduced. One of these is
his Chapter 1 in which he states, and produces a
“proof” that uncertainties, always present with mod-
est amounts of data, must obey the basic rules of
probability. It is not, as some eclectic statisticians
say today, that one has a choice; one does not, prob-
ability is the unique tool. Although he never refers
to them in this context, he was effectively saying
that Neyman and Pearson were wrong. Confidence
intervals and tail-area significance levels, are not
probability statements about the quantity of inter-
est and therefore do not satisfy the requirements of
his Chapter 1. Notice that Jeffreys proved that as-
sertion about probability. The authors of this paper
are correct to question the proof, for it does not even
stand up to the mathematics of 1939, as we in the
audience saw in 1947, but it makes an important
first step. Actually Ramsey was ahead of Jeffreys,
both in time and rigor, and it is astonishing the he
did not know of Ramsey’s work, for he lived literally
just down the road. When, in the 1950s, I pointed
this out to him, Jeffreys was also astonished, for he
had been at Ramsey’s death bed. What they had es-
tablished was that one had to be a Bayesian, there
was no logical choice.
In their perceptive analysis, the authors remind
me that I must have learned from Jeffreys the fact,
to which I now attach much importance, that prob-
ability is always a function of two arguments. It is
a defect of much modern instruction in elementary
statistics that this is unrecognized and we talk of
the probability of an event without mentioning the
conditions under which the uncertainty is being con-
templated.
His second triumph was a general method for the
construction of significance tests, putting a concen-
tration of prior probability on the null value—no
ignorance here—and evaluating the posterior prob-
ability using what we now call Bayes factors. He
was not only disagreeing with Neyman and Pearson,
but also with Popper, whose philosophy of science
was, and regrettably still is, popular among scien-
tists. Jeffreys told me that “Popper can’t do proba-
bility,” and that he had opposed Popper’s election to
the Royal Society. Bayesians take Jeffreys’s method
for granted because it can be used effectively in so
many situations. His work on estimation is less strik-
ing and he was opposed to the use of a point esti-
mate. The only estimate was the posterior density of
the parameter being considered. His distinction be-
tween probability and chance (page 5) is valuable.
Chance is a property of sequences, which de Finetti
later termed exchangeable, so that if you believe a
sequence has this property, then you accept chance
and may have beliefs, that is, probabilities, about
its value. The distinction avoids the difficulties when
probabilities of probabilities are introduced.
Much modern statistical literature discusses prob-
lems in a decision framework; for example, referring
to a decision to reject a null hypothesis. Yet despite
this, there is little statistical literature on practical
decision problems, using a loss, or utility, function
representing reality. The Cambridge of the 30s, and
perhaps even later, was concerned with knowledge
and learning, feeling that applications were outside
their ivory towers and best left to others. The The-
ory reflects this attitude and the occasional refer-
ences to decisions are incidental. In modern terms,
he was concerned with the probability of the quan-
tity of interest, given the data; and not with deci-
sions about that quantity, decisions that Ramsey, in-
fluenced by Keynes, so beautifully discussed. With
both Ramsey and Keynes, King’s College appears
more practically oriented than Jeffreys’s St. Johns.
REFERENCES
Jeffreys, H. and Swirles, B. (1946). Methods of Math-
ematical Physics. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge.
MR1744997
